




The financial strategies of Japanese multinational 
enterprises and internal capital market 
 
Chung I, Wang 
 
 























Working Paper Series 
Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
Columbia Business School 
April 2004 
The financial strategies of Japanese multinational enterprises  
and internal capital market 
 
Seinan Gakuin University 







In this paper, we discuss the problems involved with the internal capital market of 
Japanese multinational manufacturer, especially the financing roles of the finance 
subsidiaries. 
 
By pooling cash flows from other subsidiaries, finance subsidiaries might relax 
financing constraints of the group. And since the transactions payments among 
subsidiaries are centralized by the finance subsidiaries, the finance subsidiaries are able 
to catch all of the transactions information of the group. This could prevent the 
managers of subsidiaries from overestimating the profitability of their own projects, 
make it possible for headquarters to choose the higher quality projects from many 
subsidiaries by taking risk and profitability into account, and closely monitor the 
project to make sure whether it is properly conducted.  However, if funds of the group 
fall short, the finance subsidiaries have to raise funds from external capital market for 
all of the subsidiaries. For outside investors, it is hard to know where the money has 
gone and how the investment decisions have been made as well as the prospects of the 
subsidiaries' profitability. That is to say, if headquarters does not function well as a 
financial intermediary to ensure transparent and safe operation of the business, then 
the outside investors will reluctantly supply the capital to their enterprise, hence 





Starting from the 1980’s, rapidly increasing foreign direct investment by Japanese 
multinational enterprises have often been accompanied by the establishment of overseas 
finance subsidiaries. The functions of the Japanese finance subsidiaries have been evolving 
gradually since they have played the important roles of group financing for about 20 years. In 
the mid 1980’s, the original functions of the finance subsidiaries were group financing, group 
fund management, and trade financing for the other subsidiaries and parent company. In 
addition to the functions of the 1980’s, by the mid 1990’s the functions of finance 
subsidiaries extended to foreign exchange management and trade settlement, etc. for group 
companies. Many Japanese enterprises regarded such finance subsidiaries as ‘internal banks’ 
of the group. Furthermore, Japanese enterprises attempted to increase the efficiency of 
financial management of the whole group and tried to build a more advanced financial system 
inside the group, consequently the system of the internal capital market centering on finance 
subsidiaries was formed. 
Conventionally, the financing of subsidiaries’ capital expenditures by Japanese 
multinational corporations has been supported mainly by investments of the parent company 
or bank loan, etc. However, in recent years, with the development of global capital markets, 
reinforcement of financial structure, and especially the appearance of the finance subsidiary, 
Japanese companies have developed the ability to raise the funds required themselves to run 
foreign business. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the problems involved with the internal capital 
market of Japanese multinational enterprises, especially the financing roles of the finance 
subsidiary. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the recent research 
focusing on internal capital markets is described. Section 3 presents the role of the Japanese 
finance subsidiary inside the internal capital market. Section 4 includes a case study of a 
Japanese multinational enterprise, Sony Corporation. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
suggests ideas for future research. 
 
 
2. Internal capital markets 
 
2-A. Some arguments involving internal capital markets 
 
In recent years, many arguments involving internal capital markets are focusing on 
efficiency of the capital resources allocation among divisions of the corporation. Comparing 
an internal capital market with bank lending, as Gertner et al. [1994] point out, the 
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headquarters of a company can do more monitoring than banks and can more efficiently 
reallocate the limited capital resources from a poorly performing division to a better one 
(winner-picking) since headquarters owns the business units to which it allocates capital. 
Khanna and Tice [2001] examine incumbent firms’ investment in response to the Wal-Mart’s 
entry, they found that discount divisions of diversified incumbents make a quicker decision to 
stay in the discount business or withdraw. They also found their capital expenditures are 
more sensitive to the productivity of their discount business, and funds are transferred away 
from the division with the worsening prospects, suggesting that winner-picking of the internal 
capital markets function well.  
By engaging such funds allocation in the internal capital market, headquarters can create 
value even when it cannot relax overall firm-wide credit constrains (Stein [1997]). Regarding 
this argument, Hyun and Park [1999] found that a chaebol (conglomerates) firm's investment 
is significantly affected by the cash flow of other firms within the same chaebol. Their 
empirical analysis shows that internal capital market reduces the financing constraints of the 
chaebol although it does not improve the efficiency of allocation of scarce funds in the 
Korean economy. Incidentally, Shin and Stulz [1998], Mudambi [1999] and Gertner et al. 
[2002] also undertake some empirical researches to investigate the efficiency of internal 
capital markets. 
There are no absolute conclusions on whether or not the internal capital markets are 
efficient since there are some issues still to be discussed. As Stein [2002] points out, research 
incentives of a line manager working inside an integrated firm could be weakened if 
resources allocation across operating units is implemented by its CEO. That is because the 
line manager faces the risk that somebody higher up in the organization will sharply cut his 
capital allocation. And, by pooling cash flows from several projects in the internal capital 
market, headquarters might relax financing constraints of the group. However, this will make 
it more difficult for investors to discipline the firm, which tightens the financing constrains 
(Inderst and Muller [2003]). This implies there are asymmetric information problems 
between outside investors and line manager. According to Diamond [1984], to resolve the 
problem of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, financial intermediaries 
reduce the information and transaction costs by serving as delegated monitors for many 
depositors. If we follow this logic, then the headquarters of the multinational enterprise could 
have the same function as a financial intermediary in the internal capital market. Since the 
headquarters of the multinational enterprise can choose the higher quality projects from many 
sections by taking risk and profitability into account, unlike the outside investors, 
headquarters also can closely monitor the project and make sure whether it is properly 
conducted. In other words, in the internal capital market, the headquarters of a multinational 
enterprise can reduce agency cost by serving as a delegated monitor for outside investors. 
However, another problems may occur simultaneously. For example, according to Jensen 
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[1986], especially a multinational enterprise having abundant capital resources and because 
of the absence of market discipline from the lenders’ side, managers may have self-interested 
incentives to retain free cash flow and invest in negative net present value projects instead of 
paying it out to shareholders. This behavior of managers is likely to cause extra agency costs. 
As we mentioned above, when multinational enterprises take advantage of internal 
capital market to enhance the efficiency of financing, however, this may create other 
unexpected inefficiencies in the enterprise simultaneously. More concretely, when the 
headquarters introduces internal capital market into their financing system, the managers of 
the subsidiaries do not need to raise capital from outside investors by themselves and as a 
result they have more energy to concentrate on the business. Instead, the extra agency costs 
may be caused by free cash flow problems and the conflict between line managers and 
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As figure 1 shows, besides the problems noted above (i.e. free cash flow problem and 
the conflict between line managers and headquarters), we might also see the problems 
between outside investors and division managers. If headquarters does not function well as a 
financial intermediary to ensure transparent and safe operation of the business, then outside 
investors will reluctantly supply the capital to their enterprise, hence tightening the financing 
constrains. For outside investors, it is hard to know where the money has gone and how the 
investment decisions have been made as well as the prospects of the division's profitability. 
According to the empirical analysis of Hall and Liebman [1998], the CEO compensation 
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is highly correlated with firm size. Thus, it is reasonable to think the CEO has incentives to 
increase investment for expanding firm’s size. That is to say, to raise more funds, both 
directors of headquarters and subsidiaries have incentives to maximize the resources under 
their control, and hence overestimate the profitability of their own projects. Consequently, in 
order to operate an internal capital market more efficiently, headquarters have to disclose 
information properly to investors, and monitor subsidiaries more closely. 
 
2-B. Funds pooling and group financing by the finance subsidiary (ies) 
 
As we mentioned, many arguments involving internal capital markets focus on the 
efficiency of the capital resources allocation among divisions of diversified firms. In contrast, 
in this paper we focus on funds pooling, group financing, and the capital allocation functions, 
etc. of finance subsidiaries in the internal capital market of Japanese multinational 
corporations. 
First, we consider the costs of raising funds. Suppose a multinational enterprise has n 
subsidiaries, and the fund-raising costs (bank lending rate) of each subsidiary is Sbi , where i 
= 1…n. Then, if subsidiaries have surplus funds, they deposit all the money in the bank, and 
the bank deposit interest rate of each subsidiary is Sdi (i = 1…n). It is referred to as Sbi > Sdi. 
And Ii and θi denote the capital expenditures (i.e. the amount of fund-raising) and the ratio of 
surplus funds to capital expenditures of each subsidiary, respectively. θi <1 is taken here. 
Therefore, the amount of bank savings of each subsidiary is θiIi. Equation (1) implies the net 
financial expenditures of the group as a whole while each subsidiary raises funds by itself. 
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To discuss the case of fund-raising for all of the subsidiaries only by the finance 
subsidiary and pooling of surplus funds from subsidiaries into the finance subsidiary, we 
suppose Fb as the fund-raising costs of the finance subsidiary. In this case, the net financial 

































































Therefore, if the equation (1) - (2) is positive, then the costs of fund-raising of the group as a 
whole will become lower by using the finance subsidiary and pooling funds. 
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As equation (3) shows, even if the fund-raising costs of the finance subsidiary are equal 
to fund-raising costs of each subsidiary (Sbi = Fb, Fb > Sdi), pooling funds into the finance 
subsidiary and using the finance subsidiary to raise the required funds still can reduce the 
financial expenditures of the group as a whole. In this case, the part of net interest margins 
taken by banks (Sbi - Sdi) are saved since subsidiaries neither deposit surplus funds in the 
banks nor borrow money from the banks. In other words, instead of dealing with banks, 
subsidiaries pool funds into the finance subsidiary, and the finance subsidiary can reduce the 
total financial expenditures of the group as a whole by adjusting the excess and deficiency of 
the funds of each subsidiary. In fact, if we look at the equation (3) more closely we can find 
that even if the funding costs of the finance subsidiary exceeds the funding costs of each 
subsidiary (Fb > Sbi) when the group as a whole has abundant capital resources, the finance 
subsidiary still has a chance to reduce the financial expenditures of the group as a whole. 
Next, we will try to think about the incentives of the each subsidiary’s manager to make 
an effort to improve business activities. Suppose the finance subsidiary raises funds I1 from 
the external capital markets at the period 1 in order to lend funds to all of the other 
subsidiaries. At the beginning of period 2, the finance subsidiary raises funds from the 
external capital markets to lend to subsidiaries, and at the same time, accepts the pooling of 
surplus funds earned by subsidiaries during the prior period. Then the finance subsidiary will 
reallocate the capital resources according to the performance of subsidiaries. For example, 
suppose a subsidiary deposit αI1 (0<α<1) in the finance subsidiary as a result of business 
during the period 1, can obtain the extra financing αβI1 (β>1) from the finance subsidiary at 
the beginning of period 2. But, if the performance of the subsidiary turns to red, their next 
period budget will be reduced by αβI1, which is the increment of the budget of another 
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subsidiary. Suppose the probability of success of the subsidiary is P. Thus, the total 
investment amount in period 2 of the subsidiary is I1 (1+αβ) P+I1 (1-αβ) (1-P). In this case, if 
P > 1/2, the total investment amount of the subsidiary in period 2 will be increased, and as a 
result, its financing constraints will be relaxed to allow more investment. Therefore, in order 
to maximize the capital resources under their control, the managers of subsidiaries might 
make greater efforts in their business. And the subsidiary, whose total investment amount has 
been reduced, will choose projects having higher NPV to invest since it does not have enough 
capital resources to undertake all of the projects. 
As a result, from the point of view of financing, pooling funds into finance subsidiaries 
and using finance subsidiaries to raise the required funds for all of the subsidiaries might be 
more efficient especially for enterprises that have many subsidiaries. As to incentives, 
subsidiary managers cannot obtain more funds if they don’t put more efforts into their 
business since the winner-picking will be implemented. However, as we mentioned before, 
there is still a problem that effort incentives of a line manager could be weakened since he 
faces the risk that somebody higher up in the organization will sharply cut his capital 
allocation. Furthermore, the manager of enterprise having abundant free cash flow may have 
self-interested incentives to pursue private benefits, leading to extra agency costs because of 
the absence of market discipline. That is to say, in the system of the finance subsidiary, there 
are still problems of free cash flow and the decrease of incentives related to the effort of a 
line manager. 
 
3. The finance subsidiary of Japanese Multinational enterprises 
 
By the 1980’s, financing of foreign direct investment of Japanese enterprises was mainly 
supported by main banks and government financial institutions. After the mid-1980’s, against 
the background of the expansion of overseas production as a result of the rapidly increasing 
foreign direct investment, liberalization and internationalization of financing, free movement 
of capital and abolition of foreign exchange control, etc., Japanese enterprises developed the 
ability to raise the required funds themselves for running foreign business. However, 
Japanese enterprises have inevitably faced the increasing need of funds as a result of the 
expansion of business activities. Therefore, they have to develop an efficient financing 
method because of the relative increase of the costs of fund-raising. For example, for an 
enterprise that has many branches and subsidiaries around the world like Matsushita Electric 
Industrial, the efficiency of fund-raising will be too low and its costs too high if every 
subsidiary raises the required funds itself for its own business activities. As a result, many 
Japanese enterprises establish overseas finance subsidiaries in order to increase the efficiency 
of fund-raising and decrease its costs. 
Ignited by the rapid increase of foreign direct investment, especially since the mid 
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1980’s, many Japanese overseas finance subsidiaries were established for the purpose of 
financing and fund management. If we call this period the first boom of the finance 
subsidiary, then the second boom should be the late 1990’s and was ignited by Japanese 
financial reforms of 1998 (i.e. the financial "big bang"). The background of the first boom 
was the rapid increase of foreign direct investment and accelerated development of fund 
management in the bubble economy during the late 1980’s. In this period, the main roles of 
the finance subsidiary were to further lower financial expenditures by fund management and 
to save the costs of fund-raising by group financing. The background of the second boom was 
1) the greater access to the financial sector because of financial reforms of 1998, 2) 
restructuring pressure driven by rapid development of globalization and intensified 
international competition, and 3) the necessity of increasing efficiency of fund-raising in 
anticipation of the tighter bank lending. And the main roles of the finance subsidiary during 
this period were to increase the efficiency of financial management of the enterprise group as 
a whole by centralizing fund management of the group and netting the transactions payments 
among the companies of the group. By the way, at the same time the headquarters liquidated 
finance subsidiaries that have been established for the purpose of financial speculation during 
the bubble period. The enterprise, for example, could reduce the volumes of fund-raising in 
the external capital markets by pooling excess funds of the subsidiaries into the finance 
subsidiary, and adjusting the excess and deficiency of the funds of each subsidiary, therefore 
reducing the consolidated assets and improving the financial structure of the group as a whole. 
Figure 2 shows the outline of the main functions of the contemporary finance subsidiary. 
As figure 2 shows, the enterprise pools the excess funds of subsidiaries into the finance 
subsidiary and reallocates the funds according to the conditions of subsidiaries. However, if 
the funds fall short, the finance subsidiary will raise funds from external capital markets. In 
this connection, it should be pointed out that the finance subsidiary can offset the claims and 
debt caused by transactions or acts between parent company and a subsidiary or between 
subsidiaries, therefore simplifying the settlement procedures and reducing the settlement 
costs. According to the mechanism of this system, the finance subsidiary might improve the 











Figure 2: The outline of the main functions of the contemporary finance subsidiary. 
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Actually, in order to enhance the efficiency of financial management of the group as a 
whole, Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd. established a finance subsidiary in 2000 to centralize 
the financial operation of its 185 subsidiaries and introduce the pooling and netting systems1. 
The finance subsidiary of Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc pools surplus funds from 23 
subsidiaries and affiliated companies by offering 0.4% of deposit interest rate (while 1-month 
time deposit interest rate of commercial banks are about 0.04%), and lends to 14 consolidated 
subsidiaries which require funds to develop their business2. The finance subsidiary of Asahi 
Glass Co., Ltd., AG Finance centralized the fund-raising of the group companies, and adjusts 
the lending rate corresponding to the intra-group rating system on the basis of the profits 
performance or financial condition of subsidiaries. In other words, Asahi Glass tries to realize 
cost reduction and enhance the crisis consciousness of group companies; they introduced the 
market principle to impose severe conditions on under-performing subsidiaries. For example, 
a maximum 1% of lending rate is added for subsidiaries performed poorly. Besides, AG 
Finance centralized the group companies’ financial management from 1998, and has the same 
financing rate with its parent company. The financing rates of AG Finance, are 1.0 - 1.5% 
lower than that of subsidiaries, that is to say, an advantage still exists for subsidiaries even 
when they are subject to extra 1% of financing rate. As for overseas subsidiaries, the financial 
management in the United States has already been centralized by the overseas finance 
subsidiary, and Asahi Glass is also trying to expand this system to Asian subsidiaries by 
exploiting the finance subsidiary in Singapore3. As mentioned above, in recent years Japanese 
finance subsidiaries are playing the same role as external banks in providing deposit, lending, 
and settlement services, etc. to subsidiaries as an ‘internal bank’ of the group, as a result 
                                                  
1 October 17, 2000, Nikkei Newspaper. 
2 April 19, 2001, Nikkei financial newspaper. 
3 July 11, 2001, Nikkei Newspaper. 
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forming an internal capital market in the group. And besides, the finance subsidiary plays the 
central role as a ‘bank’ in such an internal capital market, and it also acts as a link between 
group companies and external capital markets. 
 
4. Case: the finance subsidiaries of Sony Corporation 
 
In the following we will describe the development of the finance subsidiaries of Sony 
Corporation (Sony) mainly based on the articles reported by both Nikkei and the Nikkei 
financial newspaper during 1985-2003, and the annual reports of Sony. 
Sony began in earnest to exploit finance subsidiaries in the early 1980’s as it was 
developing its global business activities. In the mid 1980’s, because of rapid expansion of 
overseas production, 70% of the global sales of Sony group depended on overseas markets; 
therefore how to hedge against foreign exchange risks became very important issues for Sony. 
In Switzerland, Sony’s finance subsidiary, Sony Overseas S. A. (SOSA) centralized the 
settlement of export-import payments and short-term financing of 13 subsidiaries in 9 
European countries, and dealt in 12 kinds of currencies. At the time of its establishment in 
1960, the roles of SOSA were to purchase the merchandise for European markets and control 
the inventory of merchandise. Since the 1980’s, SOSA has become a subsidiary that only 
dealt with financial management. In the 1980’s, in order to reduce exchange risks, SOSA 
centralized the settlement of intra-firm transactions, and supported the business activities of 
the group companies in Europe. For example, when European subsidiaries imported products 
from Japan via SOSA, subsidiaries did not bear any exchange risks since the purchases were 
made with local currency. Then SOSA exchanged all the European currencies to deutsche 
marks (DM), before making payments to Japanese headquarters. As for the sales in Europe, 
Japanese headquarters only needed to pay attention to the trends of DM to hedge against 
exchange risks. In this case, the Tokyo headquarters undertook the exchange risks caused by 
the transactions between Japan and SOSA, and SOSA took all the risks between SOSA and 
European subsidiaries. By the way, because of centralization of all settlements of intra-firm 
transactions, the turnover of foreign exchange transactions swelled greatly, and this gave 
SOSA big bargaining power against banks to lower their service charges. 
In 1986, in order to improve overseas financing capability, Sony established a wholly 
owned finance subsidiary, Sony Overseas Finance (SOF), in the Netherlands to issue 
commercial paper (CP) in European financial markets. SOF exchanged those CP funds for 
DM or franc FR. currencies and lent to the European manufactures and sales subsidiaries. 
That is, on the side of financing, Sony exploited SOF as a European financing center to raise 
funds in a timely way; on the side of exchange risk management, Sony utilized SOSA to 
undertake risks, and these completed the financial strategies of Sony in Europe. Besides, 
SOSA, as an internal bank of the group, also provided financial consulting service to other 
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subsidiaries. 
In the late 1980’s, as part of its business development strategies in anticipation of 
European unification, Sony established Sony Euro Finance (SEF) in the Netherlands to raise 
medium-long term funds, and the staff of SOSA also served as SEF staff. SEF intensified 
Sony’s European financing system based on the functions of SOSA. Till the late 1980’s, 
SOSA played important roles in centralizing exchange risk management and fund raising for 
the group; SEF and SOF as financing centers supported SOSA. 
In the 1990s, to improve the raising of working capital in Europe Sony expanded SEF’s 
CP program, and what’s more, in 1991 established Sony Financial Service (SFS) in the 
England to reinforce its financing activities in European markets. The funds raised by SFS 
were mainly to repay the CP debt in order to maintain a good financial condition by reducing 
short-term debt. At the same time, great strides in developments of information technology 
brought tremendous changes to Sony’s financial strategies, this made it possible for 
companies to offset the claims and debt caused by transactions and thus reduces settlement 
costs. In Japan, netting was not allowed until the revision of foreign exchange laws in 1998; 
however, Sony carried out netting early in European markets, which have few regulations. 
For example, Sony centralized all of the settlements of intra-firm transactions in Europe into 
Sony Europe Finance in London. At that time, the amount of annual intra-firm transactions 
were ¥140 billions, and about ¥40 billions were offset, thereby saving enormous bank service 
charges.  
From the 1980’s to the 1990’s, because of the rapid expansion of production and sales 
activities in Southeast Asian region by Japanese enterprises, the centralization of financing 
and foreign exchange risk management became very important as well in European region. 
Sony’s finance subsidiary in Singapore, Sony International, presided over financial affairs in 
the Asian region, and centralized foreign exchange transactions of more than 20 sales and 
manufacture related companies. This compressed about one-third of all exchange transactions 
in the Asian region. In other words, Sony International served as a financial center in the 
Asian region including India and Australia. In 1997, the turnover of Sony International 
amounted to $8 billion a year, with dealings in about 15 kinds of currencies. 
Meanwhile, in the Americas, the finance subsidiary in the U.S., Sony Capital 
Corporation (SCC) actively raised funds by issuing medium-term notes (MTN) as needed in 
European financial markets. In 1998, moreover, in order to control the fund management of 
the group companies, which were scattered from North America to South America, Sony 
established a finance subsidiary in New York. By 1998, for the settlement of transactions in 
the Americas, sales subsidiaries had to exchange their local currency for U.S. dollars before 
making payments to production subsidiaries. However, by centralizing the settlement of 
transactions between subsidiaries into the finance subsidiary, hence offsetting the total 
payments of subsidiaries, the exchange risks were vastly reduced. The finance subsidiary also 
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raised funds by issuing CP and MTN to respond to capital expenditures needs of the group 
companies in the Americas. Besides, to improve the centralization of risk management, the 
finance subsidiary even undertook payments settlement outside the Americas. As we 
mentioned, by the 1990’s, the financial strategies of Sony basically took a four-pole structure 
covering Tokyo, London, New York and Singapore. 
Since the late 1990’s until now, as accelerated of internationalization, the expansion of 
functions of finance subsidiaries is required. In 2001, Sony established Sony Global Treasury 
Services (SGTS) in London with paid-up capital of ¥90 billion, centralizing the services of 
the finance subsidiaries of Tokyo, London, New York and Singapore, and shifting all of the 
staffs of Sony Europe Finance to SGTS. Unification of such varying functions worldwide is 
an extreme exception even in multinational enterprises. The roles of SGTS are to centralize 
various financial management activities of subsidiaries in Japan, Europe, Americas and Asia, 
respectively. Furthermore, Sony changed the finance subsidiaries of Tokyo, New York and 
Singapore as SGTS’s branches, and the financial affairs of those finance subsidiaries were 
gradually transferred to SGTS.  
SGTS sets up synthetic accounts corresponding to each currency including the Yen, 
Euro, Dollar etc.; then each subsidiary opens its account in SGTS. With this system, SGTS 
undertakes the hedging of exchange risks, foreign exchange transactions of subsidiaries, 
offsetting of claims and debt among subsidiaries and group financing and so on. One of the 
core services of SGTS is lending and deposit services to subsidiaries, for example, 
subsidiaries deposit surplus funds in SGTS, and SGTS lends to subsidiaries that require funds. 
As to the financing capacity of SGTS, because other finance subsidiaries have gradually 
shifted their CP program to SGTS, and SGTS has already attained a high rating with 
abundant capital, it can raise funds with lower costs from external capital markets. By the 
way, SGTS maintains a CP program in both the U.S. and Euro CP markets, and a CP 
program in the Japanese CP market. As of March 31, 2003, the total amount of the CP 
programs was ¥2,060 billion. The total outstanding balance of CP as of March 31, 2003 was 
¥52.8 billion. In addition to the above CP programs, SGTS maintains a Euro MTN program, 
while Sony’s finance subsidiary in the U.S. maintains a U.S. MTN program and a Euro MTN 
program. As of March 31, 2003, the total amount of the MTN programs was ¥1,200 billion, 
and the total outstanding balance was approximately ¥78 billion. Sony believes that, in order 
to fund investments for future growth, redeem bonds and meet working capital needs, it can 
secure adequate resources through its access to financial and capital markets. 
Another important service of SGTS is cashless settlement services. By recognizing and 
understanding transactions among group companies through its database system, SGTS 
reduces the balance of the subsidiary that purchased products, and increases the balance of 
the subsidiary that sold products. Under this system, subsidiaries do not actually need to remit 
payments, hence saving the remittance charges and enhancing business efficiency. 
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Furthermore, as for payments to companies outside the group, SGTS makes payments for 
subsidiaries and correspondingly reduces the balance of their account. If there are payments 
coming from companies outside the group, SGTS will take the money from the bank that deal 
with the transactions, and increase the balance of the subsidiary correspondingly, hence it can 
precisely understand the movement of cash inside/outside the group, the conditions of claims 
and debt as well as capital requirements of subsidiaries; this enhances the efficiency of 
corporate governance of subsidiaries in term of financial management aspect. 
As we mentioned, again, Sony’s finance subsidiaries provide various financial services 
to other subsidiaries as internal banks of the group. Basically, as for the functions of Sony’s 
finance subsidiaries, they at least have the following three functions. Firstly, they play a 
central role of the formation of the internal capital market. Sony’s finance subsidiaries 
provide lending and deposit services, group fund management, trade financing, foreign 
exchange management, trade settlement and consulting service, etc. for the group companies 
as internal banks of the group. As for the flow of funds, including transactions payments and 
fund raising, etc. almost move through the finance subsidiaries inside the group except 
raising funds from external capital markets by finance subsidiaries. Thereby, the system of 
the internal capital market centering on finance subsidiaries was formed.  
Secondly, they play the important roles of the information production and the 
centralization of risk management. The centralization of the financial management system 
make it possible for finance subsidiaries to precisely recognize the movement of cash 
inside/outside the group and understand the financial conditions of subsidiaries. As the 
internal banks of the group, finance subsidiaries can provide the necessary information to 
headquarters for investment decision-making. Therefore, headquarters can enhances the 
efficiency of corporate governance of subsidiaries via finance subsidiaries in terms of 
financial management aspect. 
Finally, with pooling the surplus funds from subsidiaries and maintaining several 
CP/MTN programs, Sony’s finance subsidiaries significantly strengthen the capacity and 
efficiency of fund-raising, hence might reduce the capital costs of the group.  
By the way, it should be pointed out that instead of the four-pole structure of finance 
subsidiaries, Sony integrated the services of worldwide finance subsidiaries, and attempted to 
increase the efficiency of financial management of the whole group. However, it is premature 
to say whether the integration of financial services all over the world will actually improve 
the efficiency of financial management of Sony since the problems shown in figure 1 still 








Considering the arguments involving internal capital markets recent years, as the other 
self of Sony’s headquarters, finance subsidiaries collect the information with regard to 
subsidiaries and then reallocate capital resources to subsidiaries in response to the directions 
of headquarters. By pooling cash flows from other subsidiaries, finance subsidiaries might 
relax financing constraints of the group. And since the transactions payments among 
subsidiaries are settled by the finance subsidiaries, the finance subsidiaries could catch all of 
the transactions information of the subsidiaries. This means that the information production 
functions of the banks in the external capital markets have been shifted to the finance 
subsidiaries in the internal capital markets. If each subsidiary raises funds by itself and 
payments are settled through bank accounts, even the headquarters might be unable to 
recognize the detail information about the management of all of the subsidiaries, and could 
not efficiently and precisely monitor the subsidiaries. However, as the internal banks of the 
group, finance subsidiaries produce the information about other subsidiaries to headquarters, 
this make it possible for headquarters to choose the higher quality projects from many 
subsidiaries by taking risk and profitability into account, and closely monitor the project and 
make sure whether it is properly conducted. Furthermore, by centralizing the settlement of 
transactions among subsidiaries, headquarters could prevent the managers of subsidiaries 
from overestimating the profitability of their own projects that increase the resources under 
their control. That is to say, this system might enhance the efficiency of corporate governance 
of subsidiaries. Under this system, instead of external capital markets and headquarters, 
finance subsidiaries could reduce the agency costs by monitoring the subsidiaries. 
As for the fund raising ability of finance subsidiaries, as we mentioned in the section 2, 
even if the fund-raising costs of the finance subsidiary exceeds the funding costs of each 
subsidiary, by pooling funds into the finance subsidiary and using the finance subsidiary to 
raise the required funds still has a chance to reduce the financial expenditures of the group as 
a whole since net interest margins taken by banks are saved. However, finance subsidiaries 
still have some problems shown in the figure 1. If headquarters does not function well as a 
financial intermediary to ensure transparent and safe operation of the business, outside 
investors will reluctantly supply the capital to the enterprise since they do not know where 
the money has gone and how the investment decisions have been made as well as the 
prospects of the subsidiaries' profitability. And the problems of the free cash flow and the 
conflict between line managers and headquarters are still remained to be resolved. 
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